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Missouri River
ADDRESSING MISSOURI'S
DOMESTIC CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
IN THE MISSOURI RIVER:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR RESOLUTION
by Craig A. Street
1. INTRODUCTION
After the United States purchased the Louisiana Territory from
France in 1803. the Missouri River
played a vital role in the development of the American West. particularly as a means for transporting
people, animals. and goods.' The
Missouri and Mississippi Rivers,
together with their tributaries, served
as natural traffic ways that connected
southern and eastern states to the
western frontier and helped tie a
young nation together. A little over
a century later, states within the Missouri River basin would begin quarreling over utilization and management of the river, and the river would
become a wedge between the states
in a sustained interstate dispute. This
dispute continues to loom over the
Missouri River basin and has

sparked analogous intrastate
struggles that, to date, have largely
been overshadowed and overlooked.
In the 1930s and 1940s. severe flooding prompted Congress to
enact legislation authorizing the construction of six mainstem dams
along the Missouri river. Generally,
the responsibility of managing the
river, including operation of the
dams and reservoirs authorized by
Congress, lies with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. The Corps of
Engineers is responsible for orchestrating the release of flows from the
main stem reservoirs, and it manages
the river to produce benefits for various purposes. including flood control, navigation, irrigation, hydropower. water supply. water quality,
recreation, and fish and wildlife resources.2 Even before Congress au-

thorized the construction of five of
the six mainstem dams and reservoirs, however, states within the
Missouri River basin had begun arguing over the management of the
river.. Each state sought to protect
interests important to its citizenry
and campaigned to the federal government in an effort to influence the
federal government's plans for the
river. Upper basin states, including
Montana, North Dakota, and South
Dakota.' generally argued that the
river and its tributaries should be
developed to promote irrigation interests in the northwestern range of
the basin. Lower basin states. including Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and
Nebraska, fought to promote navigation and flood control. The conflicting nature of the interests the
states sought to protect in this predam era incited a dispute over allocation of water resources in the Missouri River basin and management
of the river which endures to the
present. Even today, the interstate
dispute shows few signs of resolution. Ironically, perhaps, the very
river that, in the years after the Louisiana Purchase, helped bind a young

1 US. ARMY CORPs oF ENCINFERS, MISSOURI

RIVER DiVISION, TIiE DVEI.OPMENT AND CONTROL OF THE MISSOURI RIVER I(1947);
FUNK & JolN W. ROBINSON, CHANGES IN THE CHANNEL OF TIHE LOWER MISSOURI ivER AND EFFECTS ON FISH AND WILDLIFE
8 (1974).
2 U.S. ARMY CorPs oF ENGINEERS, MISSOURI RIVER DIVISION, MISSOURI RIVER MASTER WATER CONTROL MANUAL REVIEW AND
JOHN L.

UPDATE SmvDY, DRAFT ENVIRONMEtlA. IMPACT STATEMENT 2-1 (1994) [hereinafter MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATF DEIS].
3 A number of Native American groups within the Missouri River basin have also participated in the interstate dispute, but
the states have been the principal players. Historically, the claims of Native Americans to water resources in the Missouri
River basin were largely disregarded. See general/v MICHAEL L. LAWSON. DAMMED INDIANS (1982). Early in this century, the
Supreme Court held that Native American reservations are benefited by reserved water rights which guarantee sufficient
water to enable Native American groups to occupy and use the land for a number of purposes. Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564. 576-77 (1907). Just as with federal reserved water rights, the Native Americans' reserved water rights are exempt
from appropriation under state water laws. Id. Native American reserved rights have played an increasingly important role
in water appropriation in the upper Missouri River basin as well as in the interstate dispute. Because the interstate dispute is
not the main focus of this Comment, however, the specific claims of states (other than Missouri) and Native Americans are
largely irrelevant and are, therefore, generically treated together. Consequently. references to "states" with regard to the
interstate dispute should also be inferred to mean both states and Native American groups where appropriate.
Note, portions of Colorado, Minnesota, and Wyoming also fall within the upper portion of the Missouri River basin, but the
mainstem of the Missouri River does not touch any part of these three states. To the extent this Comment considers the
dispute between upper and lower basin states, it principally centers on the dispute surrounding the management of the
mainstem Missouri River. Thus, while Colorado, Minnesota, and Wyoming have had some involvement in the Missouri
River dispute. their roles are negligible in the context of this Comment.
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America together now divides the
states within its basin.
For many years, representatives from the Missouri River basin states have attempted to reconcile their differences via countless
negotiations, but these talks have
done little to diffuse the situation.
Litigation among the states has
proven equally ineffective. Although the Corps of Engineers has
made efforts in recent years to better address and accommodate states'
interests in its operation ofthe river,s
it has consistently met with disapproval and criticism. In part, at least,
the elusiveness of resolution can be
blamed on the complexity of the
problem.6 The interests at issue are
not wholly matters of state concern.
Instead, many are matters of local,
regional, and interest-group concern.
Individual states have, themselves,
experienced tremendous difficulty
identifying and determining which
interests they should assert in the
interstate dispute. As a result, intrastate disputes-which reflect the
predominant interstate disputehave erupted. In this, the State of
Missouri is no exception.
The purposes of this Comment are fourfold. First, it will offer a brief history of the development of the Missouri River and the
ensuing interstate dispute. Second,
it will briefly introduce legal limita-

tions on state and local governments
with respect to regulating and managing federal navigable waters as
well as limitations imposed upon the
Corps of Engineers in its management and operation of the river.
Third, it will discuss, in general, the
domestic interests of the State of
Missouri with regard to the use and
management of the river. Finally, it
will propose a goal of ascertaining,
examining, and weighing the various interests of its people in order
to identify and promote the interest
or interests that, alone or in combination with one another, presumptively would yield optimum benefits
for Missouri.
II. HISTORY OF THE
MISSOURI RIVER AND THE
INTERSTATE QUARREL
A. 1800s to 1920s: Early History
of the River
The Missouri River's history is as rich as the soil lining its
banks,' and to fully appreciate and
understand the dispute surrounding
the Missouri River, it is important
to examine the river's past. Since
the United States acquired it from
France in 1803 as part of the Louisiana Purchase, the Missouri River
has been altered in many ways. The
changes have been implemented primarily for purposes of navigation,
flood control, and, to a much lesser

extent, irrigation. It has been
straightened, shortened, deepened,
narrowed, and confined. These alterations have changed the dynamics of the river in many respects,
some of which have become subjects of debate within the Missouri
River basin. The biggest changes
along the river-particularly general
navigational improvements and the
construction of six mainstem reservoirs-merit discussion.
The basin drains some
529,350 square miles in the U.S. and
approximately 9715 square miles in
Canada.' The river is approximately
2316 miles long,9 winding from its
mouth near St. Louis, Missouri, to
its headwaters near Three Forks,
Montana, where it originates at the
confluence of the Gallatin,
Jefferson, and Madison Rivers.10
While pre-development records are
incomplete, the shortening of the
river has been well documented. In
1879, the river from Rulo, Nebraska, to its mouth was 544 miles."
In 1972, the same stretch was only
498.4 miles long." It should be
noted that the entire stretch between
Rulo and the mouth was
channelized, and most of the
channelization had been completed
by 1972.13 Perhaps more significantly, the river's shortened length
was accompanied by a drastic reduction in surface area. In its natural

s For example, the Corps has been investigating alternatives to its Master Control Manual for the past several years. See
generally MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2.
6 See, e.g., JoHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER
OF PERIL 18-55 (1994).
7 See, e.g., CHARLES P. DEATHERAGE, STEAMBOATING ON THE MISSOURI RIVER IN THE SIXTIES (1924); HENRY C.
MISSOURI (1957); STANLEY VESTAL, THE MISSOURI (1945).

H.R. Doc. No. 238, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1934).
9 U.S ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MISSOURI RIVER MAINSTEM
MANUAL II-1 (1979) [hereinafter MASTER MANUAL].

HART,

THE

DARK

8

10

RESERVOIR SYSTEM, RESERVOIR REGULATION MANUAL, MASTER

SeeA ChronologyofSelectedEvents in the Missouri River Basin, CoNE. PRoc.:

10-11, 1983, ativ [hereinafterA Chronology].
"I FUNK & ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 3.
12

Id.

13

Id.

118

MELPR

THE PICK-SLOAN

Mo. BASIN

PLAN,

August

Missouri River
state, the river was shallow and meandering, with abundant backwaters,
chutes, sloughs, oxbows, sandbars,
and islands.14 In 1879, the river's
total surface area was 121,739
acres.'5 By 1972, this area had been
reduced by roughly 50%, to fewer
than 61 thousand acres (not including the mainstem reservoirs).' 6
Early changes along the
Missouri River were intended to take
advantage of the river's expansive
reach and its potential for carrying
commerce. In the years following
the Louisiana Purchase, the Missouri
River hosted any number of brave
navigators who journeyed up and
dovn the river in small watercraft
such as canoes, mackinaws,
bullboats, and keelboats." While
these Missouri River pioneers undoubtedly carried goods and engaged in trading up and dovn the
river, it was only after steamboats
first entered the river in 1819" that

people began to realize the river's
potential to support a significant
amount of commerce. By 1860,
steamboats moved as far upstream
as Fort Benton, Montana,19 but this

was accomplished only after years
of governmental efforts to improve
the river's navigability.
Prior to 1824, federal govemnment officials desired to promote
navigation on all of the nation's waterways, but national leaders of the
day questioned the federal
government's power to act in furtherance of that goal. In 1818, the
United States House of Representatives passed a resolution in which it
declared Congress' power to appropriate money for the improvement
of the nation's water courses, 20 but
its bold statement lacked complete
conviction. There persisted some
degree of doubt as to whether Congress' Constitutional powers extended to regulation of waterways.
Thus, while Congress proceeded to
enact legislation which appropriated
federal funds for the survey of the
Mississippi and Ohio Rivers in 1819
and 1820, it did little else to advance
its goal of increased navigation.2 '
This changed in 1824 when the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision in which it validated
Congress' power to directly regulate

14 See Larry W. Hesse, Taming the Wild Missouri River: W17hat Has it Cost?,
I5
16

1

FUNK

navigable waters pursuant to its authority to regulate commerce under
Article 1, Section 8, ofthe U.S. Constitution.2 2 Later that year, Congress
embraced the Supreme Court's decision by enacting the first River and
Harbor Act, which was described as
"an Act to improve the navigation
of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers." 2 3 Then, in 1832, Congress
authorized the President to extend
the provisions of the River and Harbor Act of 1824 to the Missouri
River.24 For several decades thereafter, the federal government intermittently appropriated modest sums
of money to fund "examinations,
surveys, and reports; improvement
of navigation through removal of
[sand] bars, snags, wrecks, and other
obstructions; the protection of banks
at specified locations; and construction and repair of vessels, operating
equipment, and machinery required
for the work."2 s
Between the 1850s and
1880s, steamboat navigation flourished on the Missouri River. 2 6 During this period, roads and land vehicles were inadequate for carrying

FISHERIES,

March-April 1987, at 2.

& ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 3.

I.

M. CHITTENDEN,
91 (1962).

HIRAM

BARGE

HISTORY OF

EARLY

STEAMBOAT NAVIGATION ON THE MISSOURI RIVER; LIFE

&

ADVENTURES OF JOSEPH LA

is Id. at 90.

E. LASS, A HISTORY OF STEAMBOATING ON THE UPPER MISSOURI RIVER 5 (1962). Although there are accounts of
small steamboats navigating the river above Fort Benton, for all intents and purposes, Fort Benton was the head of steamboat
navigation. Id. at 1, 5.
AND
20 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1382-86 (1818) (15th Cong., 1st Sess.). See WILLIAM J. HULL & ROBERT W. HULL, THE ORIGIN
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATERWAYS POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (1967).
21 JOHN R. FERRELL, SOUNDINGS: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE MISSOURI RIVER NAVIGATION PROJECT 5 (1996) [hereinafter
FERRELL, SOUNDINGS].
22 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 246 (1824). See also THORSON, supra note 6, at 56.
23 See River and Harbor Act of 1824, ch. 139, 4 Stat. 32 (1824); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 5.
24 See River and Harbor Act of 1832, ch. 153, § 1, 4 Stat. 551, 552-53 (1832); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 5.
25 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 5.
26 FUNK & ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 8; Bert Schneiders, The Afyth of Environmental Aanagement: The Corps, the
Missouri River, and the ChannelizationProject,70 AGRIC. HIST. 337, 338 (1996).
19 WILLIAM

MELPR

119

Vol. 5 4 No. 3
significant commerce, and railroads
had not yet penetrated the entirety
of the Missouri River basin." As a
result, steamboats were the preferred
means of transportation for commerce in the Midwest. By the late
1860s and throughout the 1870s,
railroads rapidly expanded into the
Missouri River basin and began
competing with steamboats. 8 By
some accounts, wherever the railroad met the river, steamboat commerce essentially died downstream
from the railroad-river junction. 9
The steamboats-because of the
dangers the river continually posed
to boats and their crews, as well as
the steamboats' unpredictable
schedules and limited capacities to
carry cargo-simply could not conipete.30 By 1869, the railroad ran
alongside the river from its mouth
at the Mississippi River to Sioux
City, Iowa.3 ' By the early 1880s, it
was clear that steamboat commerce
on the river was destined to collapse.32
With competition from
steamboats eliminated, railroads
became monopolistic and dominated commerce in the Midwest.33
Believing the railroads ivere unfair
27

28
29

and exploitative, residents of the
Missouri River basin began efforts
in 1880 to persuade the federal government to intervene and reestablish
commerce on the river in order to
compete with the railroads.
The
basin residents' ultimate goal was to
create a competitive midwestern
shipping market that would reduce
shipping rates and stimulate the
economy of the entire region."
These proponents of river commerce
were aware, however, that steamboats would still be incapable of
competing with railroads, so they
also sought to develop deep-draft
barge navigation on the river.36 This
would require that the naturally shallow, sinuous, braided, and free-flowing Missouri River be altered to develop a deep, stable channel that
could accommodate the deep-draft
barges.3 1 Knowing that implementation of the plan would be expensive, advocates asserted that "pegging down" the river in a stable
channel and stabilizing the river's
banks would have benefits beyond
recreating river commerce. They
contended that a stabilized channel
and banks would increase property
values, reclaim land along the river,

and generate additional tax revenues
by adding reclaimed real estate to
property tax roles.
In 1881, the Army Corps of
Engineers joined the basin residents'
campaign to reestablish commerce
on the Missouri River. 9 The Corps
presented to Congress a plan proposing a number of river improvements which it believed would stabilize the river as needed to accomplish the objectives of the basin residents.40 Congress appropriated
money to fund the Corps' plan in
1882.1 In a further step, Congress
created the Missouri River Connission in 1884 to oversee and direct
river improvements authorized by
Congress and to assess and develop
new plans to improve the river's
navigability. 42 The Commission
desired to implement a systematic
approach to the river's development,
and navigation improvements were
among the Commission's initial
goals in its plan for the river.43 In a
few short years, however, basin residents grew dissatisfied with the efforts of the Corps and the Commission because they perceived the
Commission as overly focused on
developing the navigational channel,

Schneiders, supra note 26, at
338.
Id. at 338-39; FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 3.
Schneiders, supra note 26, at 338.

"oId. at 338-39.
3

FERRELL, SOUNDINGS,

32

supra note 21, at 3.
Schneiders, supra note 26, at 339.

33

Id.

3

Id.;

3

FERRELL, SOUNDINGS,

36

Schneiders, supra note 26, at 339.
id.
FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra
note 21, at 21.

37
38

supra note 21, at 21.
supra note 21, at 21.

FERRELL, SOUNDINGS,

39Id.
4 Id at 9; FUNK & ROBINSON,
41 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS,

supra note 1, at 8.
supra notc 21, at 21.

42

43

See River and Harbor Act of 1884, ch. 229, § 1, 23 Stat.
133, 144-45 (1884); A Chronology, supra note 10, at vii,
viii.
FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note
21, at 23.
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neglecting their other goals of bank
stabilization and land reclamation.44
To some extent, the basin residents'
focus had shifted from the common
goal of navigation-the furtherance
of which residents had anticipated
would produce incidental private
benefits-to goals that would yield
greater private benefits.45 To that
end, the residents lobbied Congress,
asking that it compel the Corps and
the Commission to diversify their
improvement efforts to include
projects that would produce such
benefits. 6 Consequently, during the
late 1880s and 1890s, Congress' appropriations for river improvements
were largely ear-marked for projects
intended to benefit particular constituencies and interest groups rather
than improvement of the river as a
whole.
These appropriations severely limited the Commission's
ability to implement systematic development of the river as it desired,
and by 1900, the Commission called
for its own dissolution.48 Accordingly, Congress abolished the Missouri River Commission in 1902 and
transferred its duties and responsibilities to the Corps of Engineers."

The net effect of the Missouri River Commission's efforts
was a forty-five-mile stretch of improved river, beginning approximately five miles above Jefferson
City, Missouri.50 Along that reach,
the river's width had been substantially reduced, adding about 5500
acres of reclaimed land to property
tax roles and increasing the river's
depth to over six feet for the length
ofthe reach."
During the early 1900s, after the dissolution of the Missouri
River Commission, Congress drastically curbed its appropriations for
construction of new improvements
on the river and made few appropriations for the maintenance of existing improvements." Still seeking
relief from high shipping costs and
monopolistic railroads, basin residents again formed interest groups
and lobbied Congress to continue
development of the river, chiefly for
navigation." Urban interests seeking to develop navigation on the
river were bolstered by the unusual
and unexpected support of agricultural interests in the lower basin,54
as the railroads had proven incapable

of efficiently shipping the increasing supply of agricultural products,
resulting in waste and losses to farmers." While agricultural and other
rural interests maintained their belief that development of the river
would yield private benefits, navigation prevailed as the predominant
interest.In 1910, Congress responded to the lobby by appropriating $1 million to establish a permanent six-foot-deep, 200-footwide navigational channel between
Kansas City, Missouri, and the
mouth of the Missouri River." In
1912, Congress appropriated an additional $800 thousand in furtherance of the project and expressed its
desire for the project to be completed within ten years." After
World War I erupted in 1914, however, Congress' appropriations
lagged and, as a result, the development of the navigational channel did
not progress as quickly as expected." In 1915, the Corps of Engineers submitted a report to Congress in which the Kansas City District Engineer recommended that the
project be scrapped because the fed-

' Id. at 24-26. Statements made by the Commission leave little doubt that improved navigation was, indeed, one of its
foremost goals. See, e.g., FUNK & RoBINsoN, supra note 1, at 8.
45 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 24.
4

Id.

47 Id.

Id. at 26.
49 A Chronology,supranote 10, at viii.
48

50 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 25.
51

Id. at 25, 27.

52 Id. at 27.

" Id. at 32.
5 Id.
5 Id.
56 Id.

5 See River and Harbor Act of 1910, ch. 382, § 1, 36 Stat. 630, 660 (1910); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 35.
58 See River and Harbor Act of 1912., ch. 253, § 1, 37 Stat. 201, 219 (1912); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 41.

' FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21. at 44.

MELPR

121

Vol. 5 * No. 3
eral government was spending approximately $1.1 million per year to
save only about $10 thousand per
year in shipping costs.' Basin residents successfully fought to save the
project, but, before World War I
ended in 1918, Congress' appropriations were nominal, at best. 6' In addition, many of the Corps' resources
were rededicated elsewhere to aid in
the war effort.62 Not surprisingly,
progress on the navigational channel was severely limited.
B. 1920s to 1960s:
The Construction Boom
In the early to mid 1920s,
navigational interests once again
banded together and successfully
lobbied Congress for appropriations
to continue the channelization effort. 6 Persistent navigational interests won a major victory in 1927
when Congress authorized the Missouri River Navigation and
Channelization Project, which
would extend the six-foot by 200foot navigational channel upstream
to Sioux City, Iowa.' The project
was destined to become one of the
most important elements in the
"physical and ecological transformation of the Missouri River." 6 1 In
addition to this project, Congress

commissioned a study to determine
the feasibility of creating a ninefoot-deep navigational channel from
the mouth of the river to Kansas
City.' Although authorization of the
Missouri River Navigation and
Channelization Project was a victory
for navigation advocates, Congress
failed to dedicate funding for the
project for subsequent years.
Conseq uently, interested
Congresspeople from the Midwest
were forced to seek renewed funding for the project annually.6 7 It was
not until Franklin Roosevelt assumed the Presidency in March
1933 that the project received adequate, steady funding." That occurred when, during the Great Depression, President Roosevelt sought
to stimulate the economy by implementing a number of federally
funded public-works projects pursuant to the power Congress granted
him in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 ("NIRA"). 69
Although the Missouri River Navigation and Channelization Project is
not one for which President
Roosevelt is particularly well remembered, it served the same primary purpose as other, more popular public-works projects at the time.

That is, it provided jobs for unemBut the
ployed laborers. 7 0
channelization project also had other
purposes, most of which echoed the
objectives of the basin residents who
had sought to reestablish navigation
on the Missouri River in the 1880s.
National leaders believed development of the river would spur economic growth in the Midwest by
facilitating navigation and commerce on the river." They also believed that a stable river channel
would help prevent the erosive action of the uncontrolled river,
thereby preserving the rich bottomland soil for agricultural and industrial uses.' 2 Finally, they speculated
that a stable channel would improve
the value of real estate in the river
valley, which was thought to be depressed by the constant threat of .
flooding and erosion."
During the 1930s and until
1941, the river downstream from
Sioux City was alive with activity.
Numbering in the thousands, workers dredged the channel and constructed levees, rock revetments, and
wooden piling dikes. As the course
of the river began conforming to the
Corps' expectations, it appeared that
humans would ultimately tame the

6 Id.
61 Id at 46.
62

d

63 Id at 52.

See River and Harbor Act of 1927, ch. 47, § 1, 44 Stat. 1010, 1013 (1927) (adopting
H.R. Doc. No. 1120, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1908)); FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 54; Schneiders, supra
note 26, at 340.
65 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 337.
6 River and Harbor Act of 1927, supra note 64, § 4, 44 Stat. at
1020; FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note 21, at 54.
67 Schneiders, supra note
26, at 340.
6

68

Id.

69 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat.
195 (1933); Schneiders, supra note 26, at 34041. The Act
gave the

President the power to authorize the construction of public-works projects "[w]ith a view to
increasing employment quickly."
National Industrial Recovery Act, supra, § 203(a), 48 Stat. at 202.
70 Schneiders, supra note 26, at 341.
' Id.

72 id
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wild Missouri.
The river was busy upstream as well. In 1933, President
Roosevelt had formally approved a
plan to construct a dam across the
Missouri River in eastern Montana."
This project, which came to be
known as the Fort Peck Project,
would become the first of six dams
across the mainstem of the Missouri
River. While the project's immediate purpose was to create jobs, its
ultimate purposes were to provide
flood control and promote navigation.' 6 The project's limited pur'poses would lead to discord in the
basin, however, as upper basin residents expected to gain irrigation
benefits from the Fort Peck Project
as well.
The nation's irrigation
needs had heretofore been provided
through the Bureau of Reclamation.
The Bureau's origins may be traced
back to over thirty years before
President Roosevelt approved the
Fort Peck Project when Congress,
in the Reclamation Act of 1902, authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to administer programs designed to

develop water storage facilities
throughout the West." The Act
failed to designate a federal agency
to carry out the Secretary's programs, so the U.S. Geological
Survey's Division of Hydrography
was reorganized to form the Reclamation Service in order to implement the water storage programs."
In 1907, the Reclamation Service
became an independent agency under the Department of the Interior,
and the familiar Bureau of Reclamation was born. 9 The Bureau's primary responsibility was (and still is)
to construct and maintain irrigation
and water storage projects approved
by the Secretary of the Interior, and,
as early as 1903, the Secretary of the
Interior had approved significant irrigation projects for the upper portion of the Missouri River basin.80
These appropriations highlighted the
climatic differences between the
upper and lower basin states. In the
arid upper basin, farmers were
largely limited to producing livestock, wheat, and small grains.' In
the lower basin, where rainfall and
water supplies were generally ample,

farmers could produce a wide variety of crops as well as livestock.8
As a result, the upper basin states
tended to view water more as a commodity than did lower basin states.
Construction of the Fort Peck
Project made one thing clear: irrigation and navigation interests were
on a collision course.
When the Corps constructed the Fort Peck Project, there
were few, if any, plans to use water
stored in the reservoir to accommodate irrigation needs in the upper
basin.83 When this became evident,
upper basin interests argued fervently that irrigation 'wasone of the
project's express purposes, evidenced by the Public Works
Administration's inclusion of the
phrase "for water conservation"
among the stated purposes of the
project's first three fund allocations. 84 However, lower basin interests countered with the fact that Congress had ultimately omitted the
phrase from legislation which appropriated funds for the construction
and operation of the Fort Peck
Project.85 As it turned out, these ini-

note 21, at 61.
7 JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA 5 (1993) [hereinafter FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA]. The plan was Public Works Project Number
30. Id. Section 202(b) of the NIRA limited the President's power to authorize public-works projects with regard to river and
harbor improvements by providing that no such improvements could be implemented "unless they shall have heretofore or
hereafter been adopted by the Congress or are recommended by the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army." In this
case, the dam was recommended by the Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army.
76 See H.R. Doc. No. 238, supra note 8 (incorporated into River and Harbor Act of 1935, ch. 831, § 1,49 Stat. 1028, 1034
(1935)). House Document 238 was a Corps of Engineers' progress report on the development of the Missouri River. In
general, it described the Fort Peck Project as a flood-control and navigational improvement. H.R. Doc. No. 238, supra,
passim. But see FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 6-7.
7 Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093.,32 Stat. 388 (1902); Brian Morris, Unanswered Prayers: The Upper MissouriRiver
74 FERRELL, SOUNDINGs, supra

Basin States Take on the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, 68 N.D. L. REv. 897, 904 (1992).
78 Id.
7 Id.
80 FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 3.
81 Morris, supra note 77, at 903.
82 Id.
8
4
85

FERRELL, BIG

DA4 ERA, supra note

75, at 5.

Id.

Id. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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tial debates only foreshadowed the
battles to come.
The Corps of Engineers
closed the Fort Peck Reservoir in
1937, and it was operational by
1940. However, the Corps was not
as fortunate with the Missouri River
Navigation and Channelization
Project, as United States' involvement in World War II curtailed
progress on the project in 1941.86
During the War, Congress failed to
appropriate enough money to maintain existing improvemcnts; 7 essentially, the project was on hold for the
duration of the war.
Nevertheless, the Corps had
managed to complete much of the
work on the channelization project,
and, even before the project was interrupted by World War II, commercial navigation had been restored to
the river.88 But in the early 1940s,
the river symptomatically demonstrated a very unpleasant side-effect
of channelization: flooding. Historically, as the volume of water in the
channel increased during periods of
abundant precipitation, the river's
naturally wide, sinuous, and braided
bed would allow the water to expand
horizontally across the river, thereby
reducing the amount of water that
would otherwise overflow the river's
86

natural banks and spill out onto the
flood plain." Essentially, the river's
natural features served as built-in
flood-protection mechanisms. But
channelization and reclamation of
land along the narrowed river largely
eliminated the riverbed's horizontal,
flood-water buffer zone."0
In 1942 and 1943, flood
waters moved down the channelized
Missouri River, inundating the flood
plain and severely damaging property and agricultural lands. 9' The
constrained river only exacerbated
the severity of flooding because the
narrower, channelized river moved
faster and caused higher-than-normal water levels in the flood plain.9 In 1943, extensive flooding
prompted the House of Representatives to hold a special hearing of the
Flood Control Committee at which
Colonel Lewis A. Pick, the Division
Engineer of the Corps of Engineers'
Missouri River Division,93 made a
presentation. 94 Soon after the Flood
Control Committee's special hearing, Congress passed a resolution in
which it asked the Corps to assess
the need for flood control on the
Missouri River.95 The Corps assigned the job to Colonel Pick."
By this time, Congress was
also preparing for a wave of eco-

Schneiders, supra note 26, at 343.

88 FERRELL, SOUNDINGS, supra note

21, at 79.
Schneiders, supra note 26, at 343.
' Id. at 343-44.
89

9' Id. at 344.
92 Id.
9 FERRELL, BIG
9

THORSON,

DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 8.
supra note 6, at 63-64.

9 Id. at 64.
Id.
9

FERRELL, BIG

DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 9.

98 Id. at 8.

9 Id. at 6. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
10 FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 10.
101 Id
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nomic depression that leaders anticipated would envelop the country at
the close of World War II. As part
of its efforts to identify means to
spark economic growth, Congress
had instructed the Corps to create a
list of flood-control projects that it
believed should be implemented at
the end of World War II.9 To that
end, the Corps' Chief of Engineers
had directed Colonel Pick to make
a schedule of "worthy construction
projects" on the Missouri River.98
Consequently, by the time Colonel
Pick was assigned to respond to
Congress' new resolution regarding
flood control, he had already begun
the task of assessing construction
needs in the basin.
Colonel Pick believed that
limited-purpose projects, like the
Fort Peck Project," were unworkable because of their inherent controversy and the difficulty of justifying such enormous expense for a
limited benefit.'" Instead, Colonel
Pick desired to implement "a comprehensive plan of development for
the Missouri River valley that every
interested group of people [could]
support."' 01 In essence, he wanted
to develop a plan that considered and
accommodated all the prevalent
river interests to the greatest possible

Missouri River
extent.
The "Pick Plan," as it was
called, emphasized flood control
and navigation, but also boasted
benefits for other interests as well,
including irrigation, power production, domestic and industrial water
supplies, wildlife, and recreation.'0
In particular, the plan called for construction of a deeper, wider navigational channel from the mouth of the
river to Sioux City, Iowa; development of a series of levees along the
river below Sioux City; and, most
significantly, construction of five
massive mainstem dams and reservoirs.'o While the Pick Plan did
envision the production of some hydroelectric power, the dams it pro-

posed were designed primarily for
water retention, not power production."' As a result, the plan compromised power production for
flood control. 0 The plan carried an
estimated price tag of $661 million,
which included the cost of the five
proposed dams and a number of
other projects that had already been
authorized.' 06 The Pick Plan was not

Corps of Engineers and the Bureau
the only one of its kind, however.
In 1939, two years after the of Reclamation. In 1943, eight
closure of the Fort Peck Project, the states-Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Bureau of Reclamation had begun Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
generating its own plan for compre- South Dakota, and Wyoming-orhensive development of the Mis- ganized the Missouri River States
13
Colosouri River basin in accordance with Committee ("MRSC").'
the Reclamation Project Act of rado and Minnesota later joined the
1939.107 The project was headed by MRSC to form a powerful lobby of
William Glenn Sloan, an assistant Missouri River basin states.114 Alengineer at the Bureau of though the states' interests were diReclamation's office in Billings, vergent, they each had an interest in
Montana.i" When the Corps an- seeing the Missouri River basin's
nounced the Pick Plan, Sloan vast water resources developed in
worked hastily to complete the some way, and they realized that
Bureau's plan. 09 Known as the they could have greater influence in
"Sloan Plan," it emphasized irriga- Washington, D.C. by pooling their
tion and reclamation interests and efforts."' In February 1944, the
called for construction of ninety Corps submitted the Pick Plan to
dams and rescrvoirs throughout the Congress.' 1 6 The plan quickly
upper basin." 0 The Bureau pro- gained strong committee support in
posed to offset the costs of the dams' the House of Representatives and
construction and operation by build- was incorporated into the flood-coning seventeen power plants to pro- trol bill eventually passed by the
duce hydroelectric power."' The House."' In May of the same year,
total cost of the plan was estimated the Bureau presented Congress with
the Sloan Plan." After its introducat $1.257 billion." 2
The stage had thus been set tion, the flood-control bill, which
for a political face-off between the had passed earlier in the House, was

H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); Morris, supra note 77, at 908-09.
103 See H.R. Doc. No. 475, supra note 102; Morris, supra note 77, at 908. These were not all the projects proposed in the
Pick Plan, but they were the most significant.
104 Morris, supra note 77, at 910.
102

105 Id.
106 THORSON, supra note

6, at 64-65.
Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9, 53 Stat. 1187, 1193-94 (1939) (requiring that all such plans submitted to
Congress contain particular information). THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
108 THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
1o7

109 Morris, supra note 77, at 909.
110 THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
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stalled in the Senate when the National Reclamation Association
("NRA") lobbied against it."'9 The
NRA backed the Sloan Plan, as did
the Department of the Interior and
most governors and Congresspeople
from the West. 12 0 With deadlock appearing eminent, the MRSC and
governors of the basin states issued
strong appeals to President
Roosevelt and Congress, asking that
they encourage the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation to compromise and develop a
single plan for comprehensive development of the Missouri River.12'
Feeling pressure to reconcile their
plans, the Corps and the Bureau
hammered out a compromise, the
so-called "Pick-Sloan Plan," in
which the two agencies essentially
agreed to build all the projects they
had proposed.' 22 This synthesized
plan was presented in Senate Document 247'1and was incorporated by
reference in § 9 of the Flood Control Act of 1944.124
At the same time Congress
was struggling with the Pick and

Sloan Plans, it was considering a
new river and harbor bill that would
authorize the Corps of Engineers to
construct a permanent nine-footdeep, 300-foot-wide navigational
channel from the mouth of the Mis-

tive use, present or future, in States
lying wholly or partly west of the
ninety-eighth meridian, of such waters for domestic, municipal, stock
water, irrigation, or industrial purposes." 128 The river and harbor bill
souri River to Sioux City, Iowa.125 was enacted into law in 1945, and,
Upper basin interests were con- as expected, it authorized the concerned that the existing six-foot- struction of a nine-foot by 300-foot
deep, 200-foot-wide navigational navigational channel from the mouth
channel might have already vested of the Missouri River to Sioux City,
a right in lower basin states to suffi- a project known as the Missouri
cient flow to maintain the six-foot River Navigation and Bank Stabilidepth.' 26 As a result, upper basin in- zation Project.129
terests seized the Pick-Sloan comBoth the Flood Control Act
promise as an opportunity to protect of 1944 and the River and Harbor
their existing water interests from Act of 1945 were generic legislation
acquisition by lower basin states in designed to deal with issues conthe event the nine-foot-deep naviga- fronting the entire nation. Consetional channel was authorized and quently, neither Act provided details
constructed. 127 To protect their con- regarding the implementation of the
stituents' interests, Western Pick-Sloan Plan. After negotiations
Congresspeople negotiated the between the Corps and the Bureau
O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment in 1949, the two agencies agreed that
to the Flood Control Act of 1944, whichever agency constructed and
which provided that water used for subsequently maintained a particunavigational purposes would be lim- lar project would retain primary reited to "such use as does not con- sponsibility for its operation with
flict with any beneficial consump- regard to all uses other than flood

H19THORSON, supra note 6, at 64.
120

id.
Guhin, supra note 116, at 362; Edward Weinberg, The Birth PangsofPick-Sloan,
1983 CoNF. PROC.: THE PICK-SLOAN
MissouRi BASIN PLAN 13, 22.
122 THORSON, supra note 6, at 67. Another significant
factor compelling the Corps and the Bureau to forge a compromise
was the introduction of a bill that called for the creation of a Missouri Valley Authority-which would resemble the existing
121

Tennessee Valley Authority-to oversee the development of the Missouri River basin. Guhin, supra note 116, at 362. After
the MRSC's appeal to Congress and President Roosevelt, the President drafted a letter to Congress in which he endorsed the
Missouri Valley Authority concept. Id. Presumably, the Corps and the Bureau realized that the creation of a Missouri Valley
Authority would effectively displace both agencies in the development and operation of the Missouri River. Id.
123 S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
124 Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, § 9(a), 58 Stat. 887, 891 (1944); THORSON, supra note 6,
at 67.
125 H.R. 3961, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); THORSON,
supra note 6, at 69. The nine-foot by 300-foot navigational channel
was originally part of the Pick Plan, but was not incorporated into the flood-control bill. Instead, Congress included the
provision in the river and harbor bill because, traditionally, authorizations for navigational channel improvements had been
the province of River and Harbor legislation.
126 THORSON, supra note 6, at 69.
127
128

Id.
Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, §
1(b), 58 Stat. at 889.

129 River and Harbor Act of 1945, ch. 19, 59 Stat. 10 (1945). The O'Mahoney-Millikin
Amendment was also incorporated

into the River and Harbor Act of 1945. River and Harbor Act of 1945, supra, § 1(b), 59 Stat. at 11.
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Missouri River
control and irrigation.1 30 In two
separate subsections of the Flood
Control Act of 1944, Congress appropriated $200 million to each of
the two agencies.' 3 1 Despite the
evenhandedness of this initial appropriation, after the Corps closed the
Sharpe Reservoir-the last of the
mainstem reservoirs to be closedin 1963, funding for new construction became scarce."' The Bureau
was then unable to construct a significant number of the irrigation
projects authorized by the Flood
Control Act of 1944.'"1 Promises
to upper basin interests rang hollow,
and hostilities intensified.
In 1967, the Corps began
operating all six of the mainstem
reservoirs as a system.134 Although
the Fort Peck Project had originally
been approved by President
Roosevelt as a public-works project
pursuant to the NIRA, Congress subsequently "authorized" the project
by appropriating additional funds
needed to complete its construction
130 FERRELL,

in the River and Harbor Act of
1935.135 Later, in the Fort Peck
Power Act of 1938, Congress authorized the Corps to construct and operate hydropower facilities at the
Fort Peck Project site.136 Then, in
keeping with its newly-adopted
comprehensive approach to management of the Missouri River basin for
multiple purposes, Congress authorized the Corps to manage the Fort
Peck Dam and Reservoir for multiple purposes in the Flood Control
Act of 1944.'13 Finally, Congress
authorized the Corps to operate the
facility as part of the system of reservoirs that would be created on the
mainstem of the Missouri River after construction of the five new
mainstem reservoirs authorized in
the Act. 3
C. 1960s to Present:
The Interstate Dispute Matures
Over the next several decades, for a number of reasons, the
Corps found itself in a constant tug
of war between upper and lower

basin interests. Although some of
the Bureau's projects were eventually built, the Corps had managed
to construct far more of its own
projects, and, by virtue of the agreement between the Corps and Bureau
regarding which agency would construct and operate the different
projects, the Corps had far more
operational control over the river. In
particular, the Corps' operation of
the mainstem dams became a focus
of debate. As evidenced by the history above, prior to construction of
the mainstem reservoirs, the upper
basin states fought primarily to protect their irrigation and reclamation
interests. While the upper basin's
efforts for irrigation were thwarted,
all was not lost. After the reservoirs
were closed, the irrigation and reclamation interests shifted to a newly
discovered and very significant interest: recreation. At normal pool
elevation, the reservoirs covered 990
thousand acres of land with water 39
and created recreational opportuni-

BIG DAm ERA, supra note 75, at 123; Morris, supra note 77, at 912. This arrangement apparently had been

contemplated by the Bureau while drafting the Sloan Plan. See S. Doc. No. 191, supra note 118, at 11 ("The agency with
primary interest in the dominant function of any feature proposed in the plan should construct and operate that feature, giving
full recognition, in the design, construction, and operation, to the needs of other agencies with minor interests"). Moreover,
in its comments on the Pick Plan, the Bureau stated that the "main-stem reservoirs. . .because of their peculiarly close
relationship with flood control and navigation below Sioux City, should be constructed, operated and maintained by the
Corps of Engineers." H.R. Doc. No. 475, supra note 102, at 7. However, the Bureau did expect to retain power over "any
feature [in a Corps-constructed and -operated dam and reservoir] in which the functions of irrigation, restoration of surface
and groundwater levels, and power are dominant." Id.
131 Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 9(d) and (e), 58 Stat. at 891.
132 Morris, supra note 77, at 912.
133

Id.

The six mainstem dams and their respective reservoirs are the Fort Peck Dam and Lake, the Garrison Dam and Lake
Sakakawea, the Oahe Dam and Lake, the Big Bend Dam and Lake Sharpe, the Fort Randall Dam and Lake Francis Case, and
the Gavins Point Dam and Lewis and Clark Lake. See MASTER MANUAL REvIEw AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 1-1 to 12.
1' See River and Harbor Act of 1935, supra note 75, § 1, 49 Stat. at 1034 (1935) (calling for the "completion of improvement from mouth to Sioux City, Iowa, and construction of Fort Peck Dam").
136 Act of May 18, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-529, 52 Stat. 403.
137 This was part of the Pick-Sloan Plan incorporated into the Flood Control Act of 1944. See S. Doc. No. 247, supranote
123, at 2. Interestingly, the Plan called for Fort Peck to "be operated as a multiple-purpose reservoir primarily in the interest
134

of irrigation." Id.
138 This, too, was part of the Pick-Sloan Plan. See S. Doc. No. 247, supra note 123, at 2.
139 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-1.
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ties the upper basin states had not
fully anticipated. In part, at least,
the upper basin states embraced the
recreational benefits because many
of the projects outlined in the PickSloan Plan that had been intended
to benefit upper basin interests (i.e.,
projects originally proposed by the
Bureau in the Sloan Plan) never
came to fruition. Understandably,
the upper basin states believed the
lower basin states and the Corps of
Engineers owed them something,
and they expected payback in the
form of recognition of the importance of recreation to the upper basin.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the
recreational interests-like the irrigation and reclamation interests they
displaced-were at odds with the
navigational interests of the lower
basin states. Productive and useful
upper basin reservoirs required
stable water levels to benefit fish and
wildlife and to optimize recreational
opportunities,140 while navigation on
the lower river depended on sufficient water releases from the reservoirs to maintain certain minimum
depths in the navigational channel.14 1
In times of sufficient precipitation
throughout-the basin, the reservoir
water levels were not greatly affected, and the debate was largely
140
141

academic.
In fact, during the 1970s
and early 1980s when precipitation
was adequate, active debate centered
not on how limited water resources
should be allocated between upper
and lower basin interests but on how
"surpluses" of water in the reservoir could be used.142 Section 6 of
the Flood Control Act of 1944 authorized the Secretary of the Army
to enter into contracts for the sale of
surplus water to states, political subdivisions, private concerns, and individuals." 3 Hoping to capitalize on
water surpluses in the early 1980s,
upper basin states seriously considered proposals to sell surplus water
to various potential users. Among
the proposed sales was a deal in
which the State of South Dakota
would sell 50,000 acre-feet of water per year for forty years from Lake
Oahe in South Dakota to Energy
Transportation Systems, Inc.
("ETSI")."14 ETSI intended to use
the water to transport coal to states
outside the Missouri River basin in
a coal slurry pipeline.145 The plan
proved controversial even within
South Dakota'4 6 and was hotly contested by lower basin states. Nevertheless, after the South Dakota Conservancy District issued a permit to
ETSI authorizing it to use water for

See id, supra note 2, at 1-3.
See id.

DAM ERA, supra note 75, at 147.
143 Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124,
§ 6, 58 Stat. at 890.
'4 Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F.Supp. 1268, 1272 (D. Neb. 1984).
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Andrews, 586 F.Supp. at 1271-72.

146 FERRELL, BIG
147

See generally Andrews, 586 F.Supp. 1268.
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the stated purpose, the Secretary of
the Interior entered into a contract
with ETSI which would allow ETSI
to withdraw water from Lake Oahe
to be used in accordance with its deal
with South Dakota. 4' Missouri,
joined by Iowa and Nebraska, filed
suit in federal district court to enjoin performance of the contract.148
The three lower basin states alleged
that the Secretary of the Interior's actions were ultravires under the terms
of the Flood Control Act of 1944.149
The district court found that the Secretary of the Interior neither constructed nor maintained the Oahe
Dam and Reservoir as an irrigation,
reclamation, or power project,'5 0
and, as a result, concluded that the
Secretary had no authority to enter
into contracts that authorized the
withdrawal of water from Lake
Oahe and entered judgment in the
plaintiffs' favor, permanently enjoining performance of the contract."' ETSI appealed the decision,
and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.5 2 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the
issue, whether the Secretary of the
Interior's actions were beyond the
authority Congress granted the Secretary in the Flood Control Act of
1944,'" and the Court affirmed the
Eighth Circuit's decision.' 54

Missouri River
In its decision, the Court
examined five provisions of the
Flood Control Act of 1944 that it
believed defined the jurisdictions of
the Corps and Bureau with respect
to projects authorized by and constructed pursuant to the Act." The
Court noted that Lake Oahe had
been constructed, maintained, and
operated by the Corps, and that according to the express terms of the
Act, "such reservoirs are 'under the
control of' or 'under the direction
of' the Army Secretary.""5 6 Thus,
the Secretary of the Interior had no
power to authorize the withdrawal
of water from the Oahe, or any other
Corps-constructed, -maintained, and
-operated reservoir."' The Court's
interpretation of the Act was, perhaps inadvertently, in accordance
with the 1949 "understanding" between the Corps and the Bureau in
which the agencies agreed that
whichever agency constructed and
maintained a project pursuant to the
Act would assume primary operational responsibility for the project.
In a sense, the Court's decision validated the legality of that agreement
and extended it to grant the Corps
exclusive control of projects over
which the Corps has assumed primary operational responsibility.
More importantly, the Court's decision appeared to vest a great deal of
power and responsibility to the
Corps of Engineers over the management of water resources in the
i16

Id. at 503-05.
Id. at 505.

157

Id.
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163
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162

AND UPDATE

agement of the river during periods
of drought. Because navigation was
among the priorities declared in the
Master Manual, the Corps released
sufficient water to maintain navigation for as much of the regular naviAs a
gation season as possible.'
levels
water
reservoir
result,
dropped to their lowest points since
the system had begun operating in
1967.'6 Faced with basin-wide
backlash for its drought management practices, the Corps responded
by initiating a review of the Master
6
Manual.' '
As a general matter, the
Master Manual guides the Corps'
operation of the mainstem system on
the Missouri River.162 The Corps
first prepared the manual in 1960
and subsequently revised it in 1973,
1975, and 1979.163 The Master
Manual describes the Corps' operating philosophy and outlines basic
objectives for "optimum fulfillment" of the goals for the mainstem
dams and reservoirs. '4 Day-to-day
operations of the system are governed by the Corps' Annual Operating Plan, which is based on the
guidelines set forth in the Master
Manual.
Early in the drought, various river interests attacked the
Corps' operational guidelines as set
out in the Master Manual, and, in
November 1989, the Corps began
reevaluating the Master Manual. 65
Since that time, the Corps has been

DEIS, supra note 2, at 1-3.

Id. During the drought, the navigation seasons were, in fact, shorter than normal. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1-1.
Id.

160
161

REVIEW

Missouri River basin since the Corps
constructed, maintained, and operated all six of the mainstem reservoirs as well as a significant number of projects on the river's tributaries.
In contrast to the surplus issues that had prevailed a decade before, water resources were limited
between 1987 and 1992, when the
basin experienced a long, incapacitating drought.'5 8 The drought
aroused passions about the management of the river and fueled the dispute between upper and lower basin states. Suddenly, the debate over
limited water resources was more
than academic. The issues were very
real.
The Corps of Engineers'
management practices were at the
heart of the dispute. Not surprisingly, the upper basin states fought
hard to curtail the amount of water
being released from the reservoirs
for downstream navigational purposes. And, as expected, lower basin states demanded that the Corps
operate the mainstem reservoir system to maintain navigation. The
Corps asserted, however, that it had
very little discretion to choose between the various interests because
its drought management practices
were governed by its Missouri River
Mainstem Reservoir System, Reservoir Regulation Manual, Master
Manual ("Master Manual"), which
established the priorities for man-

165 MASTER

MANuAL

supra note 9., at 1-1.
REVIEW AND UPDATE

DEIS, supra note 2, at 1-3.
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engaged in a study to review and if existing constraints will allow. 169 presented many groups
with an opupdate the Master Manual and to
After complcting several portunity to urge the Corps to adopt
select a preferred alternative to re- phases of the study, the Corps iden- a plan that will protect their
interplace the current Master Manual.166 tified a number of public concerns ests. This has included many interAlthough this author believes that regarding the operation of the est groups that heretofore have
not
criticism during the drought was the mainstem system.'7 Considering been particularly active in the
interprimary reason for the Corps' initi- the foregoing history of the river, it state dispute. Missouri's interest
ating its review of the Master was no surprise that flood control, groups are no exception. While
cerManual, the Corps emphasized sev- navigation, and recreation were tam Missouri interest groups, most
eral factors in addition to the drought among the interests most ardently notably navigational and agricultural
as influencing its decision' 6 Pri- advocated. Other predominant con- groups, have traditionally
dominated
marily, the Corps asserted that cems included the practice of sacri- Missouri's voice in the interstate dischanged circumstances-in particu- ficing other beneficial uses to meet pute, theirs are not the only interests
lar, changes in public attitudes to- hydropower demands; maintaining promoted by Missouri citizens. In
ward and increased awareness of the minimum flows in dam tailwaters; fact, many groups in Missouri are
"importance of recreation and the effects of operations on the national, opposed to the traditional navigaenvironment" -since the imple- regional, and local economies; tional interests the State ofMissouri
mentation of the original Master shoreline erosion on the reservoirs; has advocated the past several deManual motivated it to commence fish and wildlife, especially endan- cades. These conflicting interests
the study to reconsider its regula- gered species; wetlands; effects of will be developed more fully below.
tions.'" In its study, the Corps has releases on lower channel configu- At this point, it is sufficient to unsought to [s]olicit input from inter- ration (because channel configura- derstand that the foregoing history
ested parties and determine public tion affects navigation, fish and of river development and interstate
concerns/issues; [i]dentify alterna- wildlife habitat, wetlands, etc.); dispute is the stage on which
tives to the current Water Control lower river icing (because icing af- Missouri's intrastate dispute has and
Plan; [e]stablish a basis for identi- fects domestic and industrial water will be played out.
fying the plan that best meets the supplies, channel configuration, fish
wide variety of contemporary needs and wildlife habitat, flooding, etc.); 111. LEGAL AND OPERAserved by the Mainstem System; public safety; water supplies (both TIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
[e]valuate social, economic, and en- in the reservoirs and along the river);
An already complex probvironmental impacts of existing and and water quality"' As may be len has been further complicAted by
alternative plans; [a]ddress legal seen, many concerns are interrelated, the entanglement of legal issues surconstraints on changes to operations; which contributes to the Corps' rounding it. Although a complete
[o]btain the input of the basin States' problem of developing a universally analysis of the legal framework surgovernors, the Indian tribes, and satisfactory management plan.
rounding the development and manother interested parties; [ildentify the
The Corps has not conagenent of the Missouri River is not
best plan for operating the Mainstem pleted its study, but it has made sig- warranted by this Comment,' 7" there
System; and [e]xpedite the process nificant progress toward selecting an are a few legal particulars worthy of
to allow early implementation of alternative water control plan. The brief discussion. These include
the
recommended operational changes, Corps'reviewandupdatestudy has limitationsonstateandlocal
gov" Id. at 1-3 to 1-4.
167
68

Id at 1-3.

Id Others have recognized changes in circumstances
concerning demands for and issues surrounding water
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Missouri River
ernments with respect to federal
navigable waters and the restraints
imposed upon the Army Corps of
Engineers in its management and
operation of the Missouri River.
A. Limitations on State and Local Governments
Under the Supremacy
Clause of the federal Constitution,
the rights and powers of state and
local governments are limited by the
federal government's power with
respect to federally navigable waters.'" In Gibbons v. Ogden,'7 4 the
Supreme Court affirmed Congress'
power to directly regulate navigation
on navigable waters pursuant to its
power to regulate interstate commerce. Since Gibbons, the Supreme
Court has spent considerable time
delineating Congress' so-called
"navigation" power over navigable
waters. The Court has defined navigable waters to include all interstate
waterways that have been used for
1"
'7
'75
176
177
178
'79

commercial interstate navigation in
the past;'" those that could have
been used for commercial interstate
navigation in the past had reasonable
improvements been made (whether
or not they could presently be
made);'1 6 those that are presently
being used for commercial interstate
navigation;'" those that are presently
capable of being used for commercial interstate navigation if reasonable improvements are made;" and
those that otherwise could be used
for commercial interstate navigation
in the future."' In addition, Congress can regulate activities on nonnavigable tributaries if those activities adversely impact the navigable
capacity of navigable waters'8 0 or
otherwise affect interstate comCongress' navigation
merce."
power includes the authority to exercise control over both navigable
and nonnavigable waters for purposes of navigation."' As a result,

Congress may authorize construction of projects designed to enhance
navigation.18 Likewise, it is within
Congress' power to authorize construction of projects that will obstruct navigation.'" This is true even
if the project will effectively destroy
the navigable nature of a waterway.'85 When confronted with Congressional authorizations of multiple-purpose projects, the Supreme
Court held that so long as navigation was one of the purposes for a
project-essentially, no matter how
trivial-such projects were valid exercises of Congress' navigation
86
power.'
One particularly significant
derivation from the navigation
power has been the navigation servitude, which the Supreme Court
first formally recognized in Gibson
v. United States."

Briefly stated,

the navigation servitude permits the
federal government to impair or in-

U.S. CONST. art. VI.
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871); AppalachianElec., 311 U.S. 377.
The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874);,AppalachianElec., 311 U.S. 377.
Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. 377.

United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). This is a proper exercise of Congress'
navigation power. See id.
181 FPC v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90 (1965). This is not an exercise of Congress' navigation power but of its power to
regulate interstate commerce generally. See id.
182 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713 (1865); Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941)
(holding that Congress can exercise control over nonnavigable waters in order to improve the navigable capacities of navigable waters).
183 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
18 South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876).
180

185

See id.

Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). Furthermore, Congress' designation of a project as a navigation improvement enjoys a presumption that Congress is making a valid exercise of its navigation power. See United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
187 166 U.S. 269 (1897). Although the navigation servitude is a derivative of Congress' navigation power, the two are not
coextensive in application. The navigation power extends to all navigable waters as well as nonnavigable tributaries on
which activity may impact the navigable capacity of navigable waters, but the navigation servitude generally does not extend
to nonnavigable waters. See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States ex rel TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S.
266 (1943), remanded 138 F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S. 773 (1944); United Statesv. Kansas City Life Ins.
Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). But see United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960) (overruled in part by the
River and Harbor Act of 1970, § I11, Pub. L. No. 91-611, 84 Stat. 1818, 1821 (1970)).
186
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terfere with private property rights
in the water of and land riparian to
navigable vaterways without incurring liability for compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Essentially, the federal government's navigation power
vests the federal government with
dominant rights in the water of and
the land riparian to navigable waters.
These federal rights constitute a servitude on private owners' titles to
the land and water. Thus, federal
activities that impair or interfere with
certain private property rights traditionally regarded as Constitutionally
protected are not necessarily protected if the government's activities
are valid exercises of the federal
government's navigation power over
navigable waterways. For example,
the Supreme Court has refused to
order compensation when the federal government has destroyed access to navigable waterways,"'
when it has required bridge owners
to change the elevations of
bridges,'8 9 when it has constructed
or ordered abatement of structures
on the beds of navigable waters,'"
and when it has destroyed oyster
beds.' 9 ' Most importantly, for purposes ofthis Comment, the Supreme
Court has specifically held that the

federal government is not required
to pay compensation when it destroys state-created water rights in
navigable waters.'" Consequently,
state water rights in navigable waters are subservient to the federal
government's power over navigable
waters.
By virtue of the Supremacy
Clause,'19 Congress' commerce and
navigation powers effectively trump
state and local attempts to regulate
navigable waters or commerce
thereon. Because the Missouri River
is a navigable waterway under the
test set out above,' 94 the federal govemnient effectively controls the river
and a significant number of its tributaries. This control forces states to
work with the federal government
in order to protect their interests in
navigable waterways.
B. Restraints on the Army Corps
of Engineers
In the Flood Control Act of
1944, Congress authorized construction of the projects proposed in the
Pick-Sloan Plan by making reference to Senate Document 247,
which embodied the Corps/Bureau
compromise. 95 Most significantly,
for purposes of this Comment, the
Pick-Sloan Plan called for the construction of five new mainstem dams

and reservoirs on the Missouri River
and directed that the existing Fort
Peck facility be operated in conjunction with the five new projects after
they were constructed.'" The Act
declared a number of Congressional
policies, two of which are particularly pertinent to this Comment:
[I]t is hereby declared to be
the policy of the Congress
to recognize the interests
and rights of the States in
determining the development of the watersheds
within their borders and
likewise their interests and
rights in water utilization
and control, as herein authorized to preserve and
protect to the fullest possible extent established and
potential uses, for all purposes, of the waters of the
Nation's rivers; [and] to facilitate the consideration of
projects on a basis of comprehensive and coordinated
development.'
This passage evinces, first,
Congress' desire to establish a comprehensive plan for the development
of the nation's water resources and,
second, its intent to respect the

See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Scranton v. Wheeler,
179 U.S. 141(1900); United States . Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
189 See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Hannibal
Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 194 (1911);
Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917).
'9 See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.
R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941). But see Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312 (1893); United States v.
Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900) (both holding that compensation will
be ordered unless Congress' authorization of the obstruction is express and unqualified). See also Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S.
82(1913).
188

'9' Briggs,

229 U.S. 82 (1913).

Chandler-DunbarWater Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
193 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
'9 See Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. 377; see also
supra text accompanying notes 175-179.
1 See supra notes 123-24.
19 S. Doc. No. 247, supra note 123, at 2-3.
'92

i9

Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, §
1, 58 Stat. at 888.
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states' rights and interests in water
resources within their borders. The
Pick-Sloan Plan clearly envisioned
construction of numerous multipleuse projects that would be operated
to achieve "maximum benefits for
flood control, irrigation, navigation,
power, domestic and sanitary purposes, wildlife, and recreation."W98
The Flood Control Act, in contrast,
did not expressly state all its purposes, although it clearly designated
flood control, navigation, and irrigation as its principal purposes. 1 "
Equally apparent, however, is that
the Act's purposes are not limited
to just flood control, navigation, and
irrigation. In Section 4, for example,
the Act authorizes the Corps of Engineers "to construct, maintain, and
operate public park and recreational
facilities in reservoir areas under the
control of the War Department.""2 1
This provision strongly suggests that
development of recreational opportunities was also an intended purpose of the Act. However, it is unclear whether Congress' referential
incorporation of the Pick-Sloan Plan
in the Flood Control Act of 1944 effectively incorporated the purposes
stated in the Pick-Sloan Plan with
respect to the projects therein out-

lined. Regardless, the Corps of Engineers has essentially adopted the
purposes advanced in the Pick-Sloan
Plan for its operation and management of the Missouri River
Mainstem Reservoir System."' In
a sense, the recognition of these
multiple purposes limits the Corps'
ability to manage the mainstem system freely. Because all of the
mainstem projects were designated
as multi-purpose facilities, it would
appear to violate the Act for the
Corps to manage the system to the
exclusion of any of the identified
purposes, particularly if one believes
the Flood Control Act of 1944 did,
in fact, incorporate the purposes expressed in the Pick-Sloan Plan. If
correct, this limitation is significant
because it obligates the Corps to accommodate-to some extent, at
least-the competing interests associated with each of those purposes.
It is also significant that
Congress declared a policy of giving consideration to states' rights
and interests because it forces the
Corps, at least perfunctorily, to consult the states affected by its management and operation of the Missouri River and to consider the impacts of its operations on states'

rights and interests.202 Such an unequivocal expression of Congressional policy might be construed as
a mandate. Thus, the Corps likely
cannot refuse to consider the rights
and interests of or to involve states
in the planning and decision-making process regarding management
of the river. Generally, the Corps
has consulted with and accepted the
involvement of the affected states in
its planning and management of the
Missouri River,203 but it is worth
noting that it cannot now choose to
disregard the various states' rights
and interests in that process.
Furthermore, the Corps'
management of the mainstem reservoir system is limited by other federal laws, such as the National EnAct
Policy
vironmental
20 4
Endangered
the
and
("NEPA")
Species Act ("ESA").205 An extensive discussion of all federal laws
limiting the Corps' ability to freely
operate the system, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. It
suffices here to recognize that the
Corps does not enjoy unfettered discretion in its management of the
Missouri River.

198 S. Doc. No. 247, supra note 123, at 5.
i9
200

See Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 1, 58 Stat. at 887-89.
Id. at § 4, 58 Stat. at 889-90.

201 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE

DEIS, supra note 2, at 1-1 ("These projects were constructed and are operated and

maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ... on the Missouri River for flood control, navigation, irrigation, hydropower, water supply, water quality control, recreation, and fish and wildlife."). This is particularly significant since courts
generally give deference to an administering agency's interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S.
569 (1992); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
202 See Flood Control Act of 1944, supra note 124, § 1(a), 58 Stat. at 888 (mandating that the Corps share certain
information regarding all future plans and/or proposed projects with the states that would be affected thereby and give those
states an "opportunity for consultation" with respect to such future plans and proposed projects; the provision does not
apply to works authorized by the Act but to all future "plans, proposals, or reports" that the Corps submits to Congress).
203 Note, the Corps maintains all decision-making authority, but it gives states the opportunity to participate in the process.
204 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969).
205 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L.. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
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IV. MISSOURI'S INTERESTS asserted flood control and navigaIN THE MISSOURI RIVER
tion as its predominant interests.

As a State, Missouri is divided by various interest groups promoting different, and to some extent, conflicting interests in the management of the Missouri River.206
The principal interests asserted by
these groups are flood control, navigation, fish and wildlife, recreation,
and domestic and industrial water
supply (including water quality).
With such a wide range of concerns,
perhaps not surprisingly, Missouri
has not uniformly advocated any
particular interests in the interstate
river management dispute. 'While
certain interest groups have dominated Missouri's voice in the interstate dispute, other groups have also
sought to participate, though generally assuming limited roles and acting almost as independent parties to
the Missouri River dispute rather
than representatives of the people of
the State of Missouri. This section
will outline the different interests
asserted by groups in Missouri.
As history of the Missouri
River reveals, Missouri, like most
lower basin states, has traditionally

The proponents of flood control
were, to a large extent, ultimately
satisfied by the passage of the Flood
Control Act of 1944. Although the
Missouri River basin has been devastated by a number of floods since
the closing of the six mainstem
dams, the Corps estimates that
flood-control measures prevented
some $7 billion worth of flood damage between 1937 and 1993.207 At
the time the flood-control projects
were constructed, there were some
questions whether the savings would
ultimately be substantial enough to
justify the costs, but such questions
have now largely been dispelled.
The Corps estimates that in an average year, flood-control projects prevent approximately $44 million
worth of damage, but the annual cost
of maintaining and operating those
projects amounts to only $4.4 million.2 M" In addition, the costs of constructing, maintaining, and operating flood-control projects have been
offset by other benefits conferred by
the system, such as hydropower production and recreational opportuni-

ties." In this respect, the Pick-Sloan
Plan has been tremendously successful. 210
In contrast, Missouri's navigation proponents continue to battle
for their interests in Missouri River
management as the constant minimum flows needed to support navigation are continually threatened by
upper basin interests. Navigation
has been the traditional and most
prominent interest asserted by
groups in Missouri, and agricultural
groups have been most notable in
backing those navigation rights.
Missouri's farming interest in navigation dates back to the late 1800s
when railroads were ineffectively
meeting shipping needs for crops (as
detailed previously in the history
section of this Comment) and continues today. Acting predominantly
on behalf of the agricultural interests, Missouri's state government
officials and federal legislators have
been, and still are, the biggest voices
in advocating navigation in the interstate and intrastate river management disputes.211
While navigation interests
have traditionally been most promi-

See, e.g., Tom Uhlenbrock, Missouri River &Fortunes; Focus
on a Fish Proposal to Manipulate Level Triggers Economic, Environmental Debates, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Jan. 2, 1995, at 01A (Missouri Department of Conservation
and
206

Missouri Attorney General's Office at odds over the Corps' proposed management of the river).
207 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra
note 2, at 3-62. In 1993, alone, the Corps estimates that flood-control
projects prevented $4.1 billion in damage. Id.
208 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, MIsSOURI RIVER MASTER WATER CONTROL MANUAL
REVIEW AND UPDATE STUDY, DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ExEcUTIVE SUNmARY 11 (1994) [hereinafter MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND
UPDATE DEIS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]; see also MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-6.
209 For example, based on the Corps' estimates, average annual
hydropower production yields a net benefit of approximately
$598 million. See MASTER VANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-6 (stating that between 1988 and 1992,
the
average annual maintenance and operational costs for power production on the mainstem Missouri River were $22.2
million); MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS EXECUTIVE SUMeARY, supra note 208, at 13 (stating that "long-term
average hydropower benefits are valued at $620 million per year" on the mainstem Missouri River).
210 See George S. Mickelson, Afy
1eu of the Missouri River, 36 S.D. L. REv. 1, 34 (1991).
211 See, e.g., Scott Canon, Argunent Over
River Heats Up, THE KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 13, 1996, at C4
(Governor Mel
Carnahan and Attorney General Jay Nixon); Judith VandcWater, River Plan All Wet, SayAlissouri Officials, Farmers, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1994, at OlA (Senators Christopher Bond and John Danforth; Governor Mel Carnahan;
and
David Shorr, then-Director of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources); Julie Anderson, Federal Court Asked
to
Ensure Longer Barge Season on River, THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jul. 31, 1992, at 13SF (Attorney
General William
Webster). Note, this is not an exhaustive list.
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nently advocated, some Missouri
interest groups have argued for fish
and wildlife and recreational interests, specifically that the Missouri
River system be managed to produce
wildlife and environmental benefits
and recreational opportunities. As
previously indicated, the Corps is
now required to consider the impacts
of its operations on the environment
and wildlife by virtue of federal laws
like NEPA and ESA. Environmental groups as well as state and fcderal agencies have urged the Corps
to reevaluate its operations, giving
greater consideration to the welfare
of wildlife and the environment.
Some of these groups promote that
the river be managed in a manner
that would recreate the river's historical, natural hydrograph, particularly with regard to recreating the
"spring pulse" that naturally accompanied spring rain and snow-melt
runoff.2 12 Biologists believe these
spring rises create essential habitat
for fish spawning and foraging.'
Ideally, the elevated water levels
would cover some portion of the
flood plain and facilitate a nutrient
exchange between the flood waters
and the soil of the flood plain. Proposals to restore the spring pulse
have met with controversy because
many people believe the existing

levees would restrict the spring pulse
to a narrow, deep course and compromise the benefits historically produced. Furthermore, opponents
contend that management of the
river for a spring pulse could detrimentally impact upper basin reser212
213

voir levels as well as reduce the volume of water available for lower
basin navigation during the drier
summer months.
environmental
Many
groups and government agencies
would also like to restore the river,
to some extent at least, to its prechannelization state, with a complex
of backwaters, chutes, sloughs, oxbows, sandbars, and islands.'
Where they exist, these areas, which
were once abundant along the entirety of the Missouri River, provide
unique wetland and riparian habitat
for various aquatic and non-aquatic
plant and animal species. Proponents assert that these areas provide
flood-control (e.g., acting as a horizontal buffer zone for flood waters)
and sediment-trapping benefits and
help to decelerate the rate of degradation of the channel.215 Channel
degradation is the lowering of the
river's bed via erosive forces and is
responsible for lowering the river's
water levels and the flood plain's
water table. 21 6 This, in turn, reduces
wetland and riparian habitat.2 1 In
general, advocates of environmental restoration along the river believe
such restoration and development
will create additional recreational
opportunities, enhance the value of
fish and wildlife resources, and restore to the river more intangible
values, such as aesthetics.
Relatively minor players in
the intrastate dispute over river management, and the last to be examined in this section, include those
groups interested in domestic and

industrial water supply. This is an
important issue because the Missouri
River supplies many Missouri communities with their domestic and
industrial water needs. 2 18 As yet,
however, those interested in protecting Missouri's water supplies have
not emerged as a major interest
group in the Missouri River dispute
because water supplies have not
been seriously jeopardized by low
flows in the river. The ample supply of water has resulted, in great
part, from Missouri's highly successful advocation of navigation
rights, which generally provides sufficient water flows for both navigation and domestic and industrial
uses. Nonetheless, if flow in the
Missouri River were ever reduced
to such a degree that Missouri water
supplies were jeopardized, this
group could become a significant
player in both the intrastate and interstate dispute.
While the interstate dispute
continues to rage over management
protocol of the river, Missouri faces
its own intrastate divisions in river
interests. Flood control, a historical and longtime interest, now fades
in importance among Missouri
groups, as improvements in river
management have, overall, successfully curtailed flood damage. Navigation interests, bolstered by a tremendously strong Missouri agricultural lobby, continue to garner federal, state, and local governmental
support in their efforts to cultivate
river management policy. Interests
supporting the further development

See MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 5-9 to 5-10.
See Larry W. Hesse & Gerald E. Mestl, An Alternative Hydrographfor the Missouri River Based on the Precontrol

Condition, 13 N. A. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 360 (1993).
214 See Hesse, supra note
14.
215 See MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note
2, at 3-4 1.
216 See id.; Schneiders, supra note 26, at 348-49.
217 See MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at
3-41.
218 See Id. at 3-73.
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of wildlife and recreation opportunities face a great foe among navigation groups. Finally, interests focused on domestic and industrial
water supply have enjoyed benefits,
with little effort, basically on the
coattails of navigation proponents.
The dominant player in Missouri's
intrastate river management dispute
lies with the navigation interests, as
the other groups are not as powerful, political, or well organized to
exert as much policy-making force.
Nonetheless, navigation's dominance as Missouri's primary interest is not necessarily indicative of
its actual value to Missouri or of its
importance to the people of Missouri.
V. COMMENT
To begin, it is important to
understand this author's characterization of the ultimate goal for management of the Missouri River: to
develop a multiple-use management
plan that maximizes benefits for the
public at large and as many interest
groups as possible. As evidenced
by the history of dispute among the
states of the Missouri River basin,
this will not be easily accomplished,
if at all. One particularly troubling
aspect of this problem is that different management practices generally
yield differential and unequal regional benefits. This is the dilemma
vexing states within the Missouri
River basin. The general perception
among the states is that management
practices that benefit other regions
within the basin necessarily translate
into reduced benefits for themselves.
The net effect of this attitude has
been that none of the parties to the
dispute are focused on maximizing
overall benefits to the basin, which
would require the mainstem system

to be managed to accommodate a way, the State could determine
balance of multiple uses and inter- which interests should be promoted
ests that would produce the greatest so as to maximize benefits to the
combined return to all interested par- people of Missouri.
Ultimately, the
ties. Although the Corps has at- State must encourage the
Corps to
tempted to find workable compro- adopt a management plan that will
mises, its primary focus has been on maximize benefits to Missouri.
satisfying various interest groups, While it is unrealistic to expect the
rather than maximizing benefits to Corps to manage the river in a manthe basin. This approach presents ner that maximizes benefits for Mistwo problems. First, interest groups souri, advocating more valuable inare generally preoccupied with terests gives the Corps greater incenmaximizing benefits for themselves tive to accommodate at least some
and fail to adequately calculate or of Missouri's interests. In a
sense,
consider the opportunity costs asso- it then becomes a matter of maxiciated with management plans they mizing Missouri's benefits within
promote. Second, those groups ac- the constraints of the Corps' operatively advocating their interests do tion. By fully considering all the
not represent all the interests in- interests of its people and advancvolved. In this context, interest ing a combination of those interests
groups are generally associations of that would maximize the river's beninterested individuals who stand to efits to the state, Missouri would
receive sufficient (and usually con- strengthen its bargaining power in
centrated) benefits, or those who feel the interstate dispute. The more
strongly enough about a particular valuable the interests Missouri idenissue to organize and participate in tifies and asserts, the stronger its arthe dispute. As a result, it is unlikely gument will be.
that the Corps' current approach will
A true commitment to
ever maximize benefits to the basin maximizing benefits requires that
as a whole. Because the Corps is Missouri go beyond merely accomvested with primary responsibility modating all of its competing interfor managing the Missouri River, if ests.219 Individuals with competing
the Corps does not seek to maximize and conflicting interests have conoverall benefits to the basin, it will currently used the Missouri River for
never be accomplished.
nearly two centuries, so there can be
Even if basin-wide recon- no doubt that, to some extent, these
ciliation is never achieved, the ulti- uses may coexist. The issue is not
mate goal of maximizing benefits whether the parties involved can find
can and should be adopted at the ways for their different uses and instate level. That is, each basin state terests to coexist but how the river
should urge the Corps to implement should be managed to maximize
a multiple-purpose management benefits for the people of Missouri.
plan that would produce maximum This cannot be accomplished if less
benefits for its state. To that end, beneficial uses are accommodated
the State of Missouri should exam- at the expense of more beneficial
ine its population's interests in the uses. Thus, it is important to comMissouri River and assess the ben- pare the actual benefits of different
efits associated with each. In this uses in order to determine which

Such proposals are not uncommon.
See, e.g., Bond Introduces River Protection Initiative, Fed. Document Clearing
House, Nov. 10, 1997, available in Westlav, 1997 WL 12104672 (stating that Missouri's conflicting
uses of the Missouri
River "are not mutually exclusive" and proposing a program to better accommodate such
interests).
219
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should be encouraged and protected. efits, they are, nonetheless, impor- tion is diminished by the fact that
Traditionally, the values of different tant values to consider when seek- Missouri enjoys the benefits of navigation on the Mississippi River as
interests are compared according to ing to maximize benefits.
Bearing in mind the concept well. It is entirely conceivable that
their economic benefits. At present,
however, assessments of economic of maximizing benefits to the state, many goods currently transported on
hereinabove
benefits of interests in the Missouri as
described, the Missouri could, instead, be transRiver are, in many respects, inad- Missouri's predominant and ported by tractor-trailer or train to
longstanding devotion to navigation the Mississippi River where the
equate.
In addition, it is very diffi- as its primary interest deserves re- goods could then be transferred to
cult to assess economic values of consideration. Although navigation barges. Of all the lower basin states
interests when, in reality, there may on the Missouri River has undoubt- that enjoy benefits of navigation on
be none, as is often the case with edly benefited Missouri, the extent the Missouri River, Missouri (along
interests in natural resources. For of its benefit is debatable. Advoca- with Iowa) seems to be in the weakexample, many people value or have tion of navigation made sense in the est position to so strongly assert inan interest in the aesthetics of the late 1800s and early 1900s when terest in Missouri River navigation
natural world,22 0 but translating aes- railroads were the only real alterna- because of the availability of navithetic value into economic terms is tive for transportation of bulk goods. gation on the Mississippi River.
Another factor abating
impracticable. Unless people have At the time, railroads were not only
the opportunity and are willing to monopolistic, they were unable to Missouri's continued assertion of the
spend money to enjoy a particular transport the quantities of goods re- importance of navigation is the fact
benefit, it has no economic value. quired of them. Today, however, that not all goods are destined for
Even so, that does not mean the ben- railroads are not the only alternative locales which can be reached by
efit has no value whatsoever. For form of transportation; transporting river. Thus, it is necessary that other
example, there is little doubt that goods via tractor-trailer is now com- modes of transportation be emmany people would intrinsically monplace. Granted that long-dis- ployed, and, in fact, other forms of
value the appearance of the Missouri tance, tractor-trailer transport is nei- transportation are already being uti22
River as it existed before the Anny ther the most economical nor the lized. 1 This fact also weakens the
Corps of Engineers endeavored to most suitable forn of transportation argument that navigation is essential
channelize it. However, little or no for many goods, it is important to to transportation of goods to or from
economic value lay in the appear- realize that die entire system of trans- the State of Missouri. A reduction
ance of the river as it existed prior portation is different today. That is, in navigation would simply require
to channelization. That is, people despite the shortcomings of long- that some of the goods currently
did not spend substantial sums of distance, tractor-trailer transport, transported by river be shifted to
money in order to enjoy the benefit such transport is necessary to some other forms of transportation.
Some proponents of naviof its appearance. On the contrary, extent. For example, trucks and tracthat the navigation inargue
gation
not
goods
the United States spent millions of tor-trailers often transport
dollars to alter it. Little doubt ex- to their ultimate destination, but to dustry is of great economic imporists, however, that the river's appear- an intermediate destination at which tance to Missouri, and, if the indusance was, and perhaps still is, valu- the goods are transferred to a more try were weakened or eliminated,
able to people on some level. The economical form of long-distance Missouri would lose jobs and expepoint is simply that not all values transport, such as railroads or river rience higher transportation costs as
surrounding the Missouri River can barges. Missouri asserts that barge well as sacrifice other economic
222
Based on the Corps' eseasily be converted into economic traffic on the Missouri River is es- benefits.
terms. Despite the difficulty of as- sential to its agricultural interests, timates of the value of navigation on
signing price tags to intangible ben- but the persuasiveness of this asser- the Missouri River, this seems un220 See John L. Funk & C.E. Ruhr, Streamt Channelization in the Alidiwest, STREAM CHANNELIZATION: A SYMosiuM 5, 6
(1971).
See, e.g., Michael Mansur, Concern Voiced for River, THE KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 16, 1997, at Al (manager of the
American Commercial Marine Service Company terminal in Omaha admitting that "his company now ships by truck and rail
221

as wvell as the river").
222 See MissouRi DEP'T OF AGRIC.
ON ulE MIsSOURI RIVER (1991)

AND UNIV. OF MO. -COLUMBlA,

THE IMPACT TO MIssouRi AGRICULTURE

OF REDUCED WATERFLOW

thCreinafter MissouI DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND UNIV. OF MO.].
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likely, but, even if true, such negative impacts would be mitigated in
several ways. First, shifting
Missouri's shipping needs to alternative forms of transportation would
create new jobs, displacing those
lost in the navigation industry.
Moreover, if other economic-benefit-producing interests were promoted above navigation, they would
almost undoubtedly create new jobs
as well. Second, the navigation industry would continue to operate
along the Mississippi River, providing river transportation for goods
and opportunities for employment
in the industry. Finally, this Comment does not suggest that navigation should necessarily be eliminated
along the Missouri River. In fact,
as previously discussed, the Corps
of Engineers, presumably, cannot
manage the river to the exclusion of
any of the hereinbefore-mentioned
purposes, including navigation.223
But to the extent more beneficial
uses are presently sacrificed in order to accommodate navigation,
Missouri should seek to promote the
more valuable uses and accept any
consequent reduction in navigation.
In essence, Congressional
funding of -navigational projects is
a subsidy to navigational and agricultural interests, as evidenced by
the agricultural industry's tremendous support for navigational interests. 2 24 For each year during the five-

year period of 1988 to 1992, the
Corps estimated that $7.1 million
was spent to maintain navigational
improvements on the Missouri

where it still remains.22 6 The Corps
of Engineers now estimates that
navigation on the Missouri River is
an $1 8 -million-a-year industry. 2 7
No increase in navigational revenues
is presently anticipated, 2 28 and the
Corps estimates that Missouri is currently receiving maximum attainable
economic benefits from navigation
with $6.2 million in revenues per
year.2 29 The Corps estimates maximum attainable economic values as
those benefits that can be achieved
for a specific use by varying the
operation and management of the
river system under present conditions. As a general matter, this author does not find the Corps' "maximums," which it estimates for navigation, flood control, hydropower,
recreation, and water supplies in its
Master Manual Review and Update, 23 0 particularly compelling because they are based on the current
conditions of the system and not on
what might be achieved with new
or additional planning and development. In this respect, navigation
certainly has an advantage in the
calculation of maximum attainable
economic benefits. For well over
100 years, navigation has consistently been one of the driving purposes for development of the Missouri River basin, and virtually the
entirety of the mainstem river has

River.225 But the subsidy to navigational and agricultural interests actually has a greater price than the
$7.1 million spent per annum to
maintain navigation. Proponents of
navigation fail to accurately calculate the opportunity cost of navigation, which includes not only the
amount spent to support navigation
but the value of any benefits foregone as a result of accommodating
navigation. Thus, to accurately assess the costs of navigation, one
must add to the $7.1 million spent
each year to operate and maintain
the river for navigation the value of
lost wildlife habitat, associated decreases in fish and wildlife benefits,
decreased recreational opportunities,
as well as reductions in intangible
benefits (e.g., aesthetics), the values
of which, as already discussed, may
be difficult to assess. It is this
author's opinion that, if a realistic
opportunity cost were calculated, the
price would far outweigh the benefits of navigation on the Missouri
River, even within Missouri.
Navigation on the Missouri
River peaked in 1977, at approximately 3.3 million tons of commerce,
after which it declined and leveled
out at about half that rate, at approxi- been altered in some way to admately 1.5 million tons of commerce, vance it. These improvements have

Note, however, that prohibiting the Corps from managing the
river to the exclusion of navigation does not ensure that
navigation could or would remain a viable industry if Missouri and the Corps shifted their focus from
navigation to other
interests. Even so, the most valuable interest or set of interests ultimately should prevail. This, of
course, requires that
Missouri know which uses and interests would ultimately be the most valuable.
224 See, e.g., MIssouRi DEP'T
OF AGRIC. AND UNIV. OF MO., supra
note 222.
225 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW
AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note
2, at 3-6.
226 Michael Mansur, IWorking on the
River, THE KAN. CITY STAR, May 19, 1997, at Al.
227 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE
DEIS EXECUTIVE Su{mmy, supra note 208, at 16.
228 Ann Toner, Tide of Uncertainty: Barges
on Missouri Cling to Role, THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Nov. 4, 1996, at 1
(quoting economist at University of Nebraska-Lincoln as stating "I see nothing but diminished needs for barge
transportation on the Missouri [River]").
223

229 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE
230 id.
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Missouri River
made the Missouri River as favorable to navigation as it can be made,
short only, perhaps, of constructing
a system of locks and dams as exists on the Mississippi River above
St. Louis. These factors certainly
affect estimation of the maximum
attainable economic values for navigation on the river and can be somewhat misleading.
In 1991, the Missouri Department of Agriculture and University of Missouri-Columbia conducted
a study in which they attempted to
assess the impacts of a complete loss
of Missouri River navigation on
Missouri's agricultural interests .21
This study estimated the value of
Missouri River navigation for Missouri to be much higher than the
Corps' estimates, citing losses of
over $100 million if navigation were
totally eliminated.232 The study has
been sharply criticized by C. Phillip
Baumel, an economist at Iowa State
University. 23 3 It fails to offer any
support for its assumptions and admittedly projects a "worst-case scenario." 234 Mr. Baumel points out
that, in the calculations, the study

fails to follow its own, "unrealistic
and naive" assumptions regarding
the impact of eliminating navigation
on costs of shipping by truck and
train. 235 Consequently, the significance ofthis study's findings is questionable.
In comparison, the Corps
has estimated that the federal government spends approximately $6.1
million each year for purposes of
recreation along the entire Missouri
River. 2 36 As with calculating the
amount spent on navigation, the
amount spent for recreation purposes should likewise be adjusted to
reflect the opportunity cost of promoting recreation. Unlike navigation, however, the overall benefits
realized from recreation (which
should include values of intangibles
and other interests that are enhanced
as a result of promoting recreation,
even though the Corps' estimates do
not) are much more likely to indicate a net benefit, even if a true opportunity cost were calculated. The
Corps has estimated that recreation
on the Missouri River generates
some $76 million per year along the

entire river. 237 Others have estimated the value of recreation on the
entire Missouri River to be much
higher, at approximately $300 million
per year.2 38 As already mentioned,
neither of these estimates includes
valuations of fish and wildlife and intangible benefits. 239 Nevertheless,
comparing the estimated recreation
benefits with the Corps' estimated
$18 million navigation benefits, the
gap appears substantial. Based on
assessments like the Missouri Department of Agriculture/University
of Missouri study cited previously,
many might argue that the Corps has
grossly underestimated the value of
navigation. Even ifthis is true, it can
also be argued that the Corps has
underestimated the value of recreation as well. The disparity between
the Corps' estimates of recreation
and navigation economic values most
likely reflects an actual disparity in
the value of those uses for two reasons. First, the Corps has generally
been pro-navigation, 240 and, as a result, there is very little reason to believe it would now undervalue navigation. Second, the Corps' valua-

231 MIssOURI DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND
232

UNIV. OF MO., supra note 222.
Id. at 12-13.
See Julie Anderson, Missouri Flow Plan CouldHurtShipping, THE OMAHA

WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 19, 1994, at 9SF; Scott
DisputesReports on MissouriRiver
ISUScholar
at
Al;
1994,
10,
Aug.
STAR,
CITY
THE
KAN.
Transforned?,
River
A
Canon,
River Used Littlefor Shipping
Missouri
Expert:
Larry
Fruhling,
at
20;
6.
1991,
Nov.
WORLD-HERALD,
THE
OMAHA
Flows,
Grain, THE DES MOINEs REG., Nov. 6, 1991, at 8. Moreover, then-Missouri Attorney General William Webster, himself,
233

conceded that "because the report was prepared by downstream interests, it does not come from the most objective
sources." Scott Canon, UpstreamDrought Feared,THE KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 27, 1992, at A16.
234 MIssOuRI DEP'T OF AGRIC. AND UNIV. OF Mo., supra note 222, at 5.
235 See ISU Scholar Disputes Reports on Missouri River Flowvs, supra note 233, at 20. The study asserts that costs of

shipping by truck or train would double in the event navigation were eliminated. Id. Mr. Baumel asserts that in the

calculations, the University actually tripled those costs. Id.
236 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS, supra note 2, at 3-6. It is unknown how much individual states spend
annually for purposes of recreation on the Missouri River.
237 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS ExEcUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208, at 15.
238 Julie Anderson, Group CriticizesNavigationRole, THE OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 16, 1997, at 19SF.
239 The Corps has not attempted to estimate the value of fish and wildlife benefits on the Missouri River even though fish
and wildlife is one of the purposes for which the mainstem system is to be operated. Presumably, the Corps' failure to assess
such a value is due to the difficulty of doing so.
240 This is evidenced by the fact that, since the late 1800s, the Corps has repeatedly encouraged Congress to authorize river
improvements for purposes of navigation.
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tions of recreation and navigation
were both calculated during its recent review of the Master Manual.
Consequently, it may be inferred that
the valuations were derived in a simi-

well-developed on the Missouri
River in Missouri, which depresses
the estimates of recreation's maximum attainable economic values for
Missouri. This author believes there
lar manner, and, if one is underesti- is a great potential for
planning and
mated, then the other is likely to be developing new recreational
opporas well. The net result is that, tunities along the river which would
whether or not the two valuations increase the "maximum" benefits
are accurate, the disparity between obtainable from recreation.
State
the two estimates most likely re- and federal agencies have,
in fact,
flects an actual difference in values. worked to develop some recreAssuming the discrepancy ational opportunities along the river
is real, and there is no reason not to in Missouri, although not extendo so, it is obvious that recreation is sively. 244 Such efforts will increase
already a much larger industry on the maximum attainable economic
the Missouri River than navigation. benefits from recreation and
should
Although most of the recreational be encouraged to the extent
they will
benefits are enjoyed by upper basin maximize benefits for Missouri.
states as a result of the reservoirs, 24 1
If Missouri were to adopt a
it is reasonable to believe that if Mis- goal of maximizing overall
benefits
souri worked to more fully develop to the state, it would
not necessarily
recreational opportunities on the mean that navigational and agriculMissouri River, as well as to enhance tural interests would be abandoned.
fish and wildlife habitat and to in- There is no reason
to believe that, in
crease intangible benefits, it could order to maximize benefits,
navigarealize benefits far exceeding those tion should or must be eliminated
it presently realizes. An example of from the Missouri River, but, if navithis potential is evident in the recre- gation is not among Missouri's most
ation benefits enjoyed by Iowa, valuable interests in
the river, the
where recreation generates approxi- state should not continue to revere
mately $4 million per year.24 2 It is and assert navigation
as its primary
noteworthy that the river travels a interest in the river. Moreover,
since
longer distance through Missouri the navigation maintenance costs are
than Iowa, and neither state boasts an indirect subsidization of agricula mainstem reservoir.
tural interests, it is conceivable that
The Corps estimates that the federal government could
directly
Missouri is currently receiving subsidize agricultural interests and
"maximum" benefits from recreallow the river to be used for other,
ation on the Missouri River, with re- more beneficial purposes, such
as
ceipts of approximately $2.5 million recreation and fish and wildlife. Such
each year. 2 4 3 Unlike navigation, an approach would enable
Missouri
however, recreation has not been to realize greater benefits and
to

mitigate any harmful effects a reduction in navigation might have on
agricultural interests.
VI.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

The Missouri River has
played an important, albeit frequently
divisive, role in the history of our
nation. Its vast water resources
have provided extensive benefits to
the people of the Missouri River
basin, but they have also been a
source of contention among the basin states. Since the 1940s, the Missouri River basin states have been
embroiled in a dispute over the
Corps of Engineers' management of
the Missouri River. In the dispute,
each state has sought to protect and
promote interests in the river that are

important to its residents.

Fre-

quently, however, the interests of the

people within each state are, themselves, in conflict. This has resulted
in the outbreak of intrastate disputes
in which opposing interest groups
within each state battle for predominance. The State of Missouri has
experienced the same domestic
struggles.
In the interstate dispute,
Missouri has traditionally asserted
navigation and flood control as its
primary interests. These interests
have enjoyed strong political support
from Missouri's state government

and federally elected legislators.
While flood-control advocates were
largely satisfied with the passage of
the Flood Control Act of 1944, navigation interests have had to continue
battling upper basin states for steady,

24' Approximately two-thirds of the estimated $76 million of recreational
benefits realized throughout the Missouri River
basin each year are realized by upper basin states. MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE DEIS,
supra note 2, at 3-79.
242 MASTER MANUAL REVIEW AND UPDATE
DEIS ExEcuTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208, at 54.
243

id

244 See, e.g., BigMuddyNot Big Enough, US Says, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Nov. 2, 1997, at 08E (discussing the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service's Big Muddy National Refuge); Jerome B. Robinson, Urban Oasis:
Searchingfora Unique Solution to
a Conmnon Environmental Problem, FIELD & STREAM, Sept. 1, 1995, at 28 (discussing
the Missouri Department of
Conservation's Eagle Bluffs Conservation Area).
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minimum flows in the Missouri River
and the longest possible navigation
season. Other, less-powerful and influential interest groups in Missouri
include proponents of recreation, fish
and wildlife, and water supplies.
These groups continue to advocate
their interests, although not to the
same extent as navigation proponents.
Recently, the Corps of Engineers began reviewing and reconsidering its management practices
regarding the Missouri River. This
review has given states and interest
groups a unique opportunity to influence the Corps' management of the
river. The period of review is also a
good time for state leaders to reevaluate the interests of their people
and to consider whether they are advancing the most appropriate interest or interests on behalf of their citizens. To that end,-Missouri should
endeavor to inventory the interests
of its people, weigh and compare the
relative values of the interests, and
determine which interests it should
advocate in the interstate dispute.
The state government and elected
state and federal officials, as public
servants and representatives of the
people, have an obligation to act on
behalf of the people of Missouri, and,
in so doing, to advocate and protect
the best interests of the people. Thus,
after identifying all of the state's interests and ascertaining their relative values, the state should urge the
Corps to manage the river in such a
manner as will promote a combination of Missouri's interests and produce maximal benefits to the people
of Missouri.
Admittedly, the notion of
maximizing benefits for all of
Missouri's people with regard to the
management and utilization of the
Missouri River is theoretical and idealistic. It would require that
Missouri's political leaders escape

political, interest-group, budgetary,
and other pressures in order to objectively weigh and balance the
state's various interests in the Missouri River. However unlikely this
may be, seeking to maximize benefits for Missouri on the Missouri
River is, nonetheless, a worthwhile
goal. As a state, Missouri should be
committed to advancing policies and
interests that, if implemented, would
secure the greatest possible benefits
for all its people. If Missouri's
elected officials are incapable of
objectively assessing the benefits of
the state's various interests in the
Missouri River, then the state should
employ independent means in order
to do so. In fact, Missouri should
consider taking a number of actions
to better ascertain, assess, and advocate the interests of its people.
Missouri should (1) conduct studies
to determine the public's attitudes
toward and opinions regarding the
use and management of the Missouri
River; (2) conduct studies to more
accurately assess the values of
Missouri's different interests, including any non-economic values of the
interests; (3) conduct studies to determine realistic opportunity costs
associated with pursuing each interest; (4) strive for objectivity and
avoid political pressures in identifying and assessing the different interests; (5) disregard history and tradition to the extent they interfere with
objectivity; and (6) focus on the best
interests of all of the state's people.
While this Comment has
focused on the activities of
Missouri's state government and
political leaders, it is important to
realize that this issue is not solely the
government's burden. Private parties, too, should take action. Persons with any interest in the Missouri River, whether navigation,
wildlife, recreation, or otherwise,
should seek to organize and partici-

pate in the intrastate debate, if not
the interstate debate. At minimum,
such parties should offer their opinions to their elected officials. Such
officials can respond to public sentiment only if they are aware of what
public sentiment is. In addition, private parties should consider conducting the same types of studies
proposed above. So long as the
party's objectivity is preserved, the
studies are no less valid. In the alternative, private parties could employ independent groups to conduct
the studies.
Although realistic assessments of costs and benefits are not
available, this author is persuaded by
the success of other basin states that
if Missouri and the federal government would dedicate as many resources to developing recreational
opportunities, fish and wildlife habitat, and intangible benefits on the
Missouri River as have been dedicated to developing and maintaining
the navigation channel over the past
several decades, the recreation,
wildlife, and intangible benefits would
far outweigh the navigation be'nefits
Missouri has heretofore enjoyed.
Subsequent to the development of
the mainstem dam and reservoir system, the upper basin states gained
an extremely profitable recreational
resource in the Missouri River.
Those states have tapped and -profited from the Missouri River's recreational potential, and Missouri can
learn a valuable lesson from them.
While the Missouri River in Missouri
lacks the recreational draw of reservoirs, it does possess appreciable
recreational potential along its
mainstem, and, if the river were
properly developed and aggressively
marketed and promoted, recreation
along the river could yield substantial economic benefits. Iowa appears
to demonstrate this concept, even on
a shorter length of the Missouri River
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than runs through Missouri. It is important to stress that promotion of
recreation, fish and wildlife, and intangible benefits does not, by itself,
require exclusion ofnavigation from
Missouri's plans for river management. Advocating that Missouri assert more-beneficial interests over
less-beneficial interests, as discussed
in this Comment, certainly does not
necessitate that one interest be promoted to the exclusion of any other.
Rather, Missouri simply should seek
to allocate resources to generate the
maximum possible benefits to the
people of this state.
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